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Abstract 10 
 Understanding the impacts of coastal storm hazards on all maritime port system 11 
stakeholders (e.g. operators, tenants, clients, workers, communities, governments) is essential to 12 
comprehensive climate change resilience planning. While direct damages and indirect impacts 13 
are quantifiable through economic data and modeling, qualitative data on the intangible 14 
consequences of storms are necessary to explicate interdependencies between stakeholders as 15 
well as conditions that substantially affect response and recovery capacities. This case study 16 
explores Hurricane Sandy storm impacts using evidence solicited from stakeholder 17 
representatives and extracted from contemporaneous and technical accounts of storm impacts on 18 
the port system at Red Hook Container Terminal, Brooklyn, New York, USA. Results highlight 19 
the wide range of direct damages, indirect costs, and intangible consequences impacting 20 
stakeholders across institutional boundaries and requiring coordination for recovery, providing 21 
insight into stakeholder relationships and dependencies in the post-disaster response and 22 
recovery process that are often not fully accounted for in current vulnerability assessment and 23 
response planning methodologies.  24 
KEYWORDS: resilience planning, disaster recovery, externalized costs 25 
1. Introduction 26 
Maritime ports are critical to the national transportation infrastructure, providing access 27 
to an oceangoing international trade network which accounts for more than 80% of the global 28 
trade by volume, including critical imports ranging from vehicles and raw materials to food and 29 
medical supplies (UNCTAD 2018).  Securing the resilience of the national port infrastructure is 30 
a primary economic and defense priority, necessitating robust resilience planning (CMTS 2017).  31 
However, ports are inherently exposed to significant risk of harm from coastal storm impacts, 32 
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because they must operate at the vulnerable land-sea interface where wind, flood, and storm 33 
surge impacts are concentrated (Ng et al. 2016). As climate change leads to rising sea levels and 34 
intensified storm impacts in many parts of the globe (Melillo et al. 2014), ports must account for 35 
and adapt to these changes over both mid- and long-term planning horizons (Becker et al. 2018; 36 
USDOT 2014; EPA 2008).  37 
The port stakeholder cluster (De Langan 2004) includes port owners and operators; 38 
tenants, shippers, and other port clients; government regulators responsible for the safety and 39 
economic vitality of the national port system; and surrounding communities which depend on 40 
ports for access to the global economy and for employment (Ward 2001; Becker et al. 2013). 41 
Different port stakeholders play different roles in the port’s resilience decision-making, including 42 
through direct planning (in the case of internal stakeholders such as owners and operators) and 43 
through external economic or political influence (Zhang et al. 2017; Freeman 2010, Bryson 44 
2004). In turn, different stakeholders bear the harms and costs of storm impacts to port 45 
operations differently as well. In some cases, the harms of a storm impact may not only affect a 46 
stakeholder that is directly damaged (e.g., a port operator that must repair damaged cranes), but 47 
may also be externalized to other stakeholders throughout the cluster that are do not have direct 48 
responsibility or capacity for repairing the damage, but that nevertheless depend on its recovery 49 
to resume normal operations (e.g., a shipper that must reroute cargo and defray lost revenue). 50 
These externalized harms propagate throughout the stakeholder cluster according to a network of 51 
economic and institutional inter-reliance among stakeholders that is not always necessarily fully 52 
accounted for or engaged by planning processes (Zhang et al. 2017; Becker et al. 2014; Messner 53 
et al. 2015).  54 
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A robust understanding of how all harms and costs of storm impacts are either 55 
internalized or else propagated throughout the stakeholder cluster is critical to achieve proactive, 56 
comprehensive resilience planning (Messner et al. 2015). So too is an understanding of how 57 
those impacts function differently in different ports according to each port’s unique 58 
circumstances (Becker et al. 2014). Identifying port-specific impacts is a first step toward 59 
identifying and deciding between resilience strategies. However, impact assessment methods 60 
often do not allow for a detailed understanding of how storm impacts might have differential 61 
effects on different components of the stakeholder cluster, whether because the scale of analysis 62 
is too broad to capture effects on individual stakeholders (Lian et al. 2007; Hallegatte 2008), or 63 
because the scope of analysis is constrained to particular quantifiable impacts, such as insured 64 
losses (Grossi et al. 2005) or direct damage to structures (Curtis 2007; LADOT 2006). Because 65 
impacts may propagate through the stakeholder cluster as indirect or intangible impacts, not only 66 
quantitative but also qualitative data are necessary to comprehensively characterize storm 67 
impacts on a port. There is a need for improved integration of qualitative impact data with the 68 
quantitative impact modelling and data used in the vulnerability assessment methods that provide 69 
the basis for resilience planning and decision making (Aerts et al. 2018; Stempel et al. 2018; 70 
Becker et al. 2014; Di Baldassarre et al. 2015). This paper contributes to the field of port policy 71 
and management through a theory-based analysis of stakeholders’ perceptions. The cascading 72 
impacts resulting from hurricanes have economic, social, and environmental effects on numerous 73 
stakeholders throughout a port system. These cascading consequences are still not well 74 
understood, nor are they properly accounted for in current port planning practice. 75 
This case study builds on work conducted by Becker et al in the ports of Gulfport, 76 
Mississippi, USA and Providence, Rhode Island, USA, and seeks to expand and improve the 77 
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information available to decision-makers regarding coastal storm impacts for ports confronting 78 
key policy decisions in resilience planning (Becker et al. 2014). There is a rich literature 79 
describing the value of the case study approach, especially in emerging areas such as climate 80 
adaptation and resilience. As Yin states, “The distinctive need for a case-study approach arises 81 
out of the desire to understand complex social phenomena” (2008). And, as further elaborated by 82 
Flyvbjerg, “a scientific discipline without a large number of thoroughly executed case studies is 83 
a discipline without systematic production of exemplars, and a discipline without exemplars is an 84 
ineffective one” (2006). 85 
The subject of this case study is the Red Hook Container Terminal (RHCT; the Terminal) 86 
in Brooklyn, New York City, New York, USA, a small cargo port in the Port of New York and 87 
New Jersey. In October 2012, New York City suffered extensive damage and disruption from 88 
Hurricane Sandy. Through targeted interviews with representatives of internal and external 89 
stakeholder institutions, as well as assessment of reports on storm impacts to the Port, the case 90 
study catalogs stakeholder perceptions of the direct, indirect, and intangible impacts of that 91 
major coastal storm on the RHCT stakeholder cluster. Applying the methods used to analyze 92 
storm impacts for the ports of Gulfport and Providence in Becker et al. (2014) also allows 93 
comparison to the results from those other cities in different regions. The case of RHCT provides 94 
insight into the propagation of storm impacts through a dense urban port stakeholder cluster, 95 
provides empirical support for a typology of such impacts, identifies nontrivial and non-obvious 96 
interdependencies, and contributes to a growing body of evidence that provides the foundation of 97 
a nascent area of theory with direct practical applications to port management and policy. 98 
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2. Description of Red Hook Container Terminal 99 
  RHCT is a small port facility in the Port of New York and New Jersey, located one mile 100 
south of the Brooklyn Bridge along Buttermilk Channel (Figure 1). It is the only terminal in 101 
Brooklyn that serves container ships, handling 55,000 containers in 2016. RHCT handles 102 
container, break-bulk, ro-ro, and project cargo, transferring goods to trucks for local delivery 103 
throughout Brooklyn and Long Island, as well as for longer highway hauls (Red Hook Terminals 104 
2019). Regular services include a CMA CGM round-the-world route that delivers Heineken beer 105 
from Europe, and a Seaboard service from the Caribbean and South America carrying bananas. 106 
The Terminal also hosts a container barge service across the Upper Bay to Port 107 
Newark/Elizabeth, adding an additional 20,000 containers to its annual throughput (Red Hook 108 
Terminals 2019). 109 
Insert Figure 1 – map of Brooklyn and map of terminals about here 110 
 The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (PANYNJ) own the terminal, including 111 
four piers and administrative facilities, and Red Hook Terminals LLC operates the facility. The 112 
PANYNJ Maritime Commerce Department sets building codes and provides engineering 113 
management for capital projects, but does not participate in day-to-day operations. There has 114 
been some form of cargo terminal on the site since the 1840’s, and for most of that time, 115 
maritime commerce drove the development of the surrounding Red Hook community.  116 
 Sandy made landfall in Brooklyn on Monday, October 29, 2012 as a post-tropical 117 
cyclone. A great deal of the Red Hook neighborhood south and east of the Terminal is built on 118 
reclaimed land with very little topographic relief. The combined high tide and storm surge struck 119 
low-lying Red Hook with an 11.2ft storm tide, causing an estimated 4.1ft of inundation 120 
throughout most of the community (Blake et al. 2013). Because the Terminal naturally slopes 121 
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down toward the water, inundation depths were even more severe in seaward parts of the facility; 122 
tenants at RHCT’s Pier 7 reported almost 5ft of water in their warehouse. Throughout New York 123 
City, 44 deaths were directly attributable to the storm (Jaffe et al. 2015).  124 
 The U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) closed New York Harbor waterways and ordered the 125 
evacuation of all vessels the day before the storm’s arrival, pursuant to the Heavy Weather Plan 126 
developed in collaboration with port stakeholders after Hurricanes Earl in 2010 and Irene in 127 
2011. The Port remained closed after the storm until the USCG, in collaboration with the 128 
National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), U.S. Geological Survey 129 
(USGS), and Sandy Hook Pilots, could survey all waterways for obstructions to navigation, 130 
pollution, and shoaling from storm tides. Extended power outages and fuel shortages on land 131 
impacted the city for more than a week following the storm; this was compounded by 132 
temperatures dropping below freezing, stranding many residents without heat, power, or 133 
transportation in icy, slushy conditions. Although the USCG was able to progressively open 134 
waterways to municipal sewage scows, then fuel barges, then more traffic over the following 135 
days, the fuel terminals which processed and received home heating oil, diesel, and gasoline 136 
remained crippled by the power outage, prolonging the fuel shortage even after the Port resumed 137 
operation. RHCT received its first cargo vessel on November 6, eight days after the storm.  138 
3. Methods 139 
This case study was designed to provide qualitative and quantitative storm impact 140 
information that is useful to planners and decision-makers with responsibility for implementing 141 
resilience plans and policies in U.S. and international ports (Becker et al. 2014). In order to 142 
comprehensively capture the range of impacts to the full RHCT stakeholder cluster, ‘impact’ is 143 
defined broadly to encompass the full range of direct damages, indirect costs, and intangible 144 
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consequences (IPCC 2012) which result from a major storm and which meaningfully disrupt the 145 
ability of a stakeholder to engage in normal operations. Direct damages are impacts with discrete 146 
costs, which are incurred by the action of flooding, wind, or waves on port facilities, equipment, 147 
and contents. Indirect costs to port stakeholder clusters are disruptions to the normal flow of 148 
goods and services caused by direct damages or by efforts to recover from them. Direct damages 149 
and indirect costs are impacts on the port as an economic system that can be expressed in terms 150 
of value lost to one or more stakeholders from the baseline of normal economic conditions. 151 
Intangible consequences for port stakeholder clusters encompass the range of impacts that are 152 
substantively significant and relevant to stakeholder decision-making but nevertheless are poorly 153 
described by economic valuation, such as loss of life, health impairments, or damage to the 154 
environment or to cultural heritage. 155 
For the purposes of this research, the RHCT stakeholder cluster is defined broadly to 156 
include both internal and external stakeholders with an economic or institutional interest in the 157 
successful normal operation of the Terminal (Becker et al. 2014). Internal stakeholders include 158 
port owners (PANYNJ) and operators (Red Hook Terminals LLC). External stakeholders include 159 
economic stakeholders (stakeholders with interests defined through contractual relationships, e.g. 160 
tenants, shippers, insurers), public policy stakeholders (government institutions with 161 
jurisdictional responsibilities for the port, e.g. USCG, Department of Transportation, state and 162 
city agencies), community stakeholders (residents and institutions representing the cultural and 163 
economic interests of hinterland communities, e.g. Community Boards, environmental groups), 164 
and academic stakeholders (institutions which generate information or scholarship relevant to 165 
port decision-making).  166 
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 The study was designed to elicit two related kinds of information: comprehensive 167 
cataloging of storm impacts to RHCT stakeholders, and identification of which stakeholder 168 
group(s) (internal, economic/contractual, public policy, and/or community) carried the ‘burden 169 
of recovery’ for each impact. The burden of recovery is defined broadly to encompass the 170 
investment of financial, human, and institutional resources (i.e., time, effort, and expense) in 171 
recovering from an impact; it is sensitive to stakeholders’ perceptions of their own and other 172 
stakeholders’ capacity (e.g. technically, financially) and responsibility or authority (e.g. legally, 173 
politically) to undertake such recovery activities.  174 
The burden of recovery may be borne internally, or it may be externalized to other 175 
members of the stakeholder cluster. In the case of direct damages, the burden of recovery is 176 
generally borne internally by stakeholder institutions (Becker et al., 2014). For example, a tenant 177 
may write off the loss of water-damaged products from its warehouse, or the port operator may 178 
pay for replacement electrical equipment using an insurance payout. In the case of indirect costs, 179 
economic losses can often become externalized and may not be ‘paid for’ by any one stakeholder 180 
institution, but nevertheless may require the time and effort of one or more stakeholder 181 
institutions to recover from. For example, the economic impact of damage to USCG aids to 182 
navigation is felt by all economic stakeholders because of the disruption to vessel traffic until the 183 
waterway is reopened. In that example, the burden of paying for repairs to the navigation aids 184 
falls to the USCG (and, by extension, the federal taxpayer). In the case of intangible 185 
consequences, some impacts are articulated broadly as an impairment of response capacity (e.g., 186 
the challenge of learning new disaster recovery procedures on the fly), while others can be 187 
solved by the explicit efforts of particular stakeholder institutions (e.g., debris which blocks 188 
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roads and impedes repair efforts for stakeholders across the cluster, but which must be addressed 189 
by the cleanup efforts of particular stakeholders, such as the city government or landowner).  190 
Many of these indirect and intangible harms are externalized throughout the stakeholder 191 
cluster. For the purposes of recording and analyzing results, each impact was classified 192 
according to the stakeholder who held the burden of recovery only as perceived by the sources. 193 
Data were gathered from two types of sources: interviews with port stakeholders and 194 
contemporaneous news and retrospective technical reports addressing port damage from the 195 
storm. Interviewees were identified through personal contacts, internet research, and referral by 196 
other participants. In total, five port stakeholders were interviewed: two representatives of 197 
PANYNJ, two representatives of USCG, and one representative of a community group (Table 1). 198 
As the Terminal is a small port with limited economic and institutional reach, this sample of the 199 
stakeholder cluster, taken in conjunction with the written reports, was considered adequate to 200 
capture the experiences of the stakeholder cluster. Interviews were conducted in-person and by 201 
telephone, using a semi-structured technique. In one case, two interviewees attended the same 202 
interview; their responses were coded individually. The interview instrument (Appendix A) was 203 
adapted from Becker et al. (2014) to elicit stakeholder impressions of what impacts from the 204 
storm affected their institutions and to what parts of the stakeholder cluster the burden of 205 
recovering from those impacts fell. The instrument was approved by the University of Rhode 206 
Island Institutional Board. The interviews were recorded and transcribed for coding. 207 
Insert Table 1 about here 208 
 Reports on Sandy’s impacts from academic literature and from contemporaneous news 209 
accounts were identified through internet searches and selected according to the criterion that 210 
they catalog storm impacts on Red Hook Container Terminal or the broader PNYNJ system, as 211 
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reported by members of the port stakeholder cluster. Six scholarly articles and four 212 
contemporaneous news reports were collected and coded (Table 2). 213 
Insert Table 2 about here 214 
 Coding procedures from Becker et al. (2014) were employed in this study using the 215 
NVivo qualitative data analysis software package to ensure that results were compatible. 216 
Interview transcripts and reports were reviewed line-by-line and impacts were provisionally 217 
identified. Once all potential impacts were highlighted, they were coded a second time to ensure 218 
there was no duplication or conflation, and assigned to common ‘main ideas.’ Finally, ‘main 219 
ideas’ were refined into explicit sub-types, and sub-type sets were coded into three top-level 220 
types (direct, indirect, intangible impacts). The three top-level impact types used by the 221 
International Panel on Climate Change were used for consistency and because they are 222 
conceptually comprehensive – any articulable impact fits into at least one impact type (IPCC 223 
2012). However, sub-types were coded independently without consulting the Becker et al. results 224 
to avoid interpretive bias. 225 
Impacts were articulated as specifically as possible to make the results comprehensive 226 
and holistic; for instance, the impact of disruption to the flow of food supplies was kept distinct 227 
both from the more general impact of disruption of the flow of cargo, and from the causally 228 
related impact of waterway closures, according to how the respondent specifically expressed the 229 
impact. Each impact mentioned in a written report was considered to have been mentioned only 230 
once in that report regardless of how often the words appear in the text itself.  231 
Once coded, impacts were then assigned to stakeholder groups according to the burden of 232 
recovery. All impacts were parsed in this way, even where interviewees or reports were not 233 
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explicit about who ended up bearing the burden, based on the authors’ best interpretation of the 234 
contractual or jurisdictional obligations associated with each impact. 235 
4. Results 236 
 Through analysis of five interviews and ten reports, 227 mentions of 82 distinct impacts 237 
were identified, including 23 unique direct damage, 31 indirect costs and 28 intangible 238 
consequences. The impacts are presented in Tables 3-5, divided into top-level impact types 239 
(direct damage, indirect cost, or intangible consequence) and sub-types. For each impact, the 240 
stakeholder group which carried the burden of recovering from the impact is identified. 241 
4.1 Direct Damages 242 
Direct damages, or damages with discrete costs incurred by the direct action of flooding 243 
or wind on port facilities, equipment, and contents, are reported in Table 3. Damage to port 244 
facilities was severe and widespread. Several structures on the Terminal experienced basement 245 
and first floor flooding, and building contents across the Terminal including computer systems 246 
and records were extensively damaged. Underground infrastructure such as electric substations, 247 
storm drains, and fire pumps was destroyed. 248 
Insert Table 3 about here 249 
 Port equipment was similarly hard hit, with cargo handling equipment disabled either by 250 
water damage to engines or salt corrosion of wheels and electrical systems. Six electric gantry 251 
cranes, which have their motors installed near ground level, were flooded out. Several of the 252 
gantry cranes at RHCT had not yet been converted from diesel to electric to conform to 253 
PANYNJ air quality guidance; these cranes were not disabled, while most of the rest of the 254 
Port’s crane equipment had to be dismantled and shipped out for refurbishment, which one 255 
source reported cost about $160,000 per crane. Some minor damage was done to barges at the 256 
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Terminal, although elsewhere in the Port one barge was stranded on a pier. Cargo  was seriously 257 
damaged, with numerous containers thrown around the Terminal and washed into the waterway. 258 
One tenant reported that flooding of its warehouse resulted in $10 million in write-offs. 259 
4.2 Indirect Costs 260 
 Indirect costs, or disruptions to the normal flow of goods and services caused by direct 261 
damages or by efforts to recover from them, are reported in Table 4. Key among these costs 262 
incidental costs to repairing damages expressed in Table 3, such as assessment, monitoring, 263 
security, and the provision of temporary replacement services.   264 
Insert Table 4 about here   265 
 Apart from waterway closures and vessel evacuations, interruptions to operations also 266 
stemmed from damage to administrative buildings, which destroyed paper records and disabled 267 
computer systems. The interruption was felt by internal stakeholders, from the revenue gap for 268 
tenants to lost wages for workers.   269 
4.3 Intangible Consequences 270 
Table 5 reports intangible consequences, encompassing a broad range of impacts that are 271 
relevant to stakeholder decision-making, but nevertheless are poorly constrained by economic 272 
valuation. This type includes a number of impacts which could feasibly be classified as direct 273 
costs, such as damage to traffic signals, but which were cited by sources as conditions which 274 
made recovery more difficult (i.e., the failure of traffic signals making travel to recovery sites 275 
harder) rather than simply costs to be paid. In these cases, the impacts were recorded as reported 276 
by the source. 277 
Insert Table 5 about here 278 
 13 
Sources strongly emphasized impacts, both on Terminal property and outside it, which 279 
impaired their ability to bring the Terminal back online. Impacts on the Terminal included 280 
damage to lighting and roads, debris on roads, and disruptions to communication systems. Not 281 
only did the system back up seawater into facilities and make direct drainage impossible, but also 282 
waste backed up through the storm drains because the City has a combined sewer system. This 283 
meant that all water damage remediation activities required environmental hazard abatement 284 
procedures as well. 285 
Impacts outside the Terminal included severe cold weather during a fuel shortage, damage to 286 
personnel’s homes and communities preventing them from participating in recovery, and the 287 
emotional toll of the widespread devastation. Finally, all interviewees discussed the complexity 288 
of coordinating disaster relief efforts and funds within their institutional contexts.  289 
5. Discussion 290 
The experience of RHCT stakeholders in the aftermath of Hurricane Sandy demonstrated 291 
the advantages and challenges of resilience planning to minimize the propagation of storm 292 
impacts through the stakeholder cluster. Ports are highly interconnected and inter-reliant 293 
systems. Stakeholders in the port stakeholder cluster rely on the goods and services of other 294 
stakeholders through contractual, institutional, and cultural relationships. In a disaster, direct 295 
damages to port facilities and resources propagate throughout the cluster along those reliant 296 
relationships as indirect costs and intangible consequences.  297 
Resilience planning ahead of the disaster event serves to anticipate the propagation of 298 
impacts and develop working relationships between stakeholders that can be activated during the 299 
response phase to abate impacts. Where impacts were not fully anticipated or working 300 
relationships did not exist and had to be developed ad hoc, indirect and intangible impacts served 301 
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to impede response and prolong recovery. The specific experiences reported by Red Hook 302 
stakeholders demonstrate the propagation of impacts through a port stakeholder cluster (section 303 
5.1), and highlight both successes and failures of the port system’s response and recovery 304 
attributable to pre-storm planning practices (section 5.2). Comparison to the reported outcomes 305 
in a separate case (Gulfport, MS, USA after Hurricane Katrina) provide the basis for discussing 306 
generalizable best practices for planning (section 5.3). 307 
5.1 Direct damages propagate as indirect costs and intangible consequences 308 
Sources reported that before Sandy, hurricanes were considered, and planned for, 309 
primarily as wind hazard events. Hurricane Sandy was primarily a storm surge event rather than 310 
a wind event. All direct damages to port facilities highlighted in interviews and reports were the 311 
results of flooding. One report cited this as the primary reason damage was so extensive: ‘The 312 
storm surge was the big issue. With a hurricane you might expect a wind event with some 313 
flooding. Instead we had a major flooding event with some wind damage’ (Wakeman & Miller 314 
2013, 12).  315 
Insert Table 6 around here 316 
The building codes for PANYNJ facilities had emphasized protection from wind damage, 317 
meaning that a great deal of critical port infrastructure – generators, transformers, motors, and 318 
computer systems – was at or below ground level (DesRoches & Murrell 2014). Likewise, the 319 
flat topography of the filled land in and around RHCT exposed the area to some of the most 320 
severe flooding in the city.  321 
The economic impact of the disruption to port commerce propagated to economic 322 
dependents of the port in the hinterlands, ranging from clients of tug and barge, water taxi, and 323 
ferry services, to the wider consumer goods marketplace. As one interviewee said: ‘there’s a lot 324 
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of things that sometimes people forget are on cargo containers, things like blood and food … 325 
things that are critical to emergency response. And it took a long time for that to get back up to a 326 
moving pace.’ 327 
Economic hardship was a major point of discussion, especially regarding the disruption 328 
of container traffic right at the opening of the holiday shopping season. Although interviewees 329 
emphasized that critical port operations such as fuel deliveries came online quickly, container 330 
operations took longer to reach pre-storm levels, both because they did not receive the same level 331 
of public health emergency prioritization, and because the necessary equipment (e.g., gantry 332 
cranes) took longer to repair.  333 
The disruption of waiting on other members of the stakeholder cluster to resume 334 
operations before being able to conduct one’s own recovery efforts was also discussed as an 335 
intangible but significant impact of the storm. One interviewee discussed how operators and 336 
tenants could not resume full operations until PANYNJ could bring their own operations fully 337 
online. Several sources discussed how all internal Terminal stakeholders relied on the USCG to 338 
clear and reopen waterways before resuming port operations. An interviewee reported that 339 
Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) lost critical hardware at the Manhattan Cruise Terminal for 340 
identifying and processing arriving passengers (e.g., scanning passports), which forced them to 341 
turn away a cruise ship which had weathered the storm at sea and subsequently had to be 342 
rerouted to Boston. All sources emphasized the reliance of the surrounding community on the 343 
port for fuel and for commerce. 344 
5.2 Resilience planning builds relational capacity to stem the propagation of impacts 345 
Resilience planning can provide a mechanism for stakeholders in the port stakeholder 346 
cluster to establish working relationships that can be activated to coordinate response and 347 
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recovery. The experience of recovering the channel versus recovering the fuel system highlight 348 
the effect of resilience planning in building such institutional relationships. Port hazard planning 349 
with internal stakeholders, tenants and clients, and public policy stakeholders including the City 350 
and the USCG prepared the port system to abate navigational hazards and reopen the waterways 351 
efficiently, minimizing indirect costs and intangible impacts. By contrast, an enduring fuel 352 
shortage, which was prolonged and exacerbated by an inability to coordinate response 353 
operations, caused a significant portion of indirect costs and intangible consequences suffered by 354 
stakeholders across the cluster. 355 
5.2.1 Waterway response and recovery 356 
The waterways remained closed until impairments to navigation could be abated. 357 
Waterway closures were the initial cause of the port shutdown, as the USCG evacuated the 358 
harbor before the storm. Immediately after, USCG activated a pre-existing response network of 359 
government and non-government vessels to survey the waterways for navigational safety, 360 
including identifying debris and shoaling, and assessing the status of aids to navigation - an 361 
effort which was impaired by damage to their own equipment and facilities. This process 362 
involved repairing aids to navigation and clearing obstacles such as drifting vessels, containers, 363 
oil spills, and other various hazards. Floating containers were highlighted by multiple sources as 364 
a significant challenge, as they can severely damage a vessel in a collision, but can often float 365 
slightly below the water’s surface, making them difficult to avoid. 366 
The burden of abating the container problem complicated response efforts. Although the 367 
USCG had jurisdictional responsibility to survey and identify containers that had floated off the 368 
terminals in the surge, the practical responsibility of who would pay to remove any given 369 
container was not always clear. For containers that were sufficiently intact to identify the owner 370 
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by serial number, the owner had clear liability to cover the cost of removal. If the container was 371 
damaged such that the owner could not be ascertained, and it posed a risk of polluting the 372 
waterway, the Coast Guard had access to dedicated funds to cover removal. If the container was 373 
damaged and was found in the waterway, the USACE took responsibility for removing it as an 374 
obstacle to navigation. However, a great number of containers beached alongside the waterway 375 
did not fall into those categories – the Coast Guard surveyed and catalogued these containers but 376 
did not have clear guidance on how to obtain funds for their removal. An interviewee reported 377 
that in many cases, these containers ended up being removed at the expense of the landowner or 378 
the city. 379 
Despite uncertainty regarding debris outside the channel, interviewees described that 380 
USCG was able to successfully collaborate within the port stakeholder cluster, including 381 
PANYNJ, tenants, and pilots, to accelerate waterway inspection and cleanup. USCG prioritized 382 
reopening the waterways to key fuel terminal facilities. Priority routes to fuel terminals were 383 
restored within days, making possible emergency fuel delivery operations to affected parts of the 384 
City. RHCT, as a container terminal, received lower priority but was navigable within eight days. 385 
Sources stated that this coordination was possible due to preexisting institutional relationships 386 
developed through the disaster recovery planning process.  387 
5.2.2 Power system response and recovery 388 
The response network developed through prior port resilience planning had not, however, 389 
developed similar lines of communication with regional electric utilities. Extensive damage to 390 
subterranean infrastructure across the city left the electric grid disabled for days, cutting off 391 
internet access and requiring stakeholders to obtain back-up generators. The huge demand for 392 
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fuel for generators, combined with the power outage itself disabling otherwise operational fuel 393 
terminals, in turn created a severe fuel shortage.  394 
As discussed above, USCG prioritized reopening deliveries to certain fuel terminals that 395 
had received less damage. This allowed the government to begin to make emergency fuel 396 
deliveries to shelters and hospitals. However, many fuel terminals were unable to resume 397 
operations due to damaged tanks, flooded pumps, and the ongoing electrical outage. 398 
Because the port community was effectively left to sit on its hands waiting for electrical 399 
systems to recover, it was not able to stem the fuel shortage even once waterways and terminal 400 
facilities were otherwise ready to reactivate. With response and recovery delayed relative to the 401 
waterway navigability, sources across the stakeholder cluster reported indirect and intangible 402 
effects of the power shortage at a higher rate than those consequent to other direct impacts. As 403 
one interviewee reported, ‘[the surrounding communities] had no gas. Many needed gas to fill 404 
generators, to get power back up at their house and keep the heat on … As soon as power went 405 
out, a lot of people went to generator systems and the generators started to go out. Then at the 406 
same time, the temperature dropped pretty precipitously. And so you had this confluence of 407 
people needed fuel for heat, fuel for electricity, fuel for their cars, fuel for all sorts of things, and 408 
it wasn’t readily available.’ 409 
Electricity, therefore, represented a bottleneck in the critical path to recovery, which an 410 
interviewee indicated was a consequence of the inability of stakeholders to coordinate ahead 411 
with the utilities through the resilience planning process. The knock-on, externalized burden of 412 
recovering under these circumstances fell to port tenants and operators (e.g., by using backup 413 
generators during the repair process) and to the public policy and community groups which 414 
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offered emergency services to those without power (e.g., government fuel deliveries by truck, 415 
and community aid groups providing warm shelters). 416 
5.2.3 Adaptivity in response and recovery 417 
Across stakeholder groups, new systems and procedures for communicating, problem 418 
solving, and processing paperwork had to be innovated on the fly. One interviewee expressed 419 
that the mix of impaired roads, fuel shortages, and damage to personnel’s homes severely short-420 
staffed PANYNJ in the first days after the storm, necessitating that the personnel on hand step 421 
into inspection and decision-making roles that were outside their normal work responsibilities. 422 
For instance, one interviewee reported that road and rail inspections had to be performed by 423 
whoever could report to work on the day after the storm, because most of the regular inspectors 424 
lived in New Jersey and couldn’t get into the city by car. This delayed the recuperation of the 425 
land transport network and cut off repair personnel and equipment.  426 
Because of this complexity, interviewees strongly emphasized the importance of 427 
adaptivity and coordination among stakeholders during the recovery process. Several 428 
interviewees described coordinating major governmental response efforts using a daisy chain of 429 
officials’ personal cell phones, depending on which carrier was online that day. 430 
Strong institutional relationships also empowered stakeholders to respond adaptively. For 431 
instance, perimeter fences and cameras were destroyed throughout the Port; this brought the 432 
Terminal and other Port facilities out of compliance with the Maritime Transportation Security 433 
Act (MTSA), which requires terminal operator to continuously maintain security equipment and 434 
procedures (MTSA 2002). An interviewee reported that the USCG, which enforces the MTSA, 435 
worked with terminal operators across the Port in the hours after the storm to identify breaches 436 
and execute temporary plan amendments under USCG regulations to fill the breaches using hired 437 
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security monitoring. As the interviewee put it, ‘the minute the Facility Security Officer could get 438 
out to the facility and assess what was going on, most of them were on the horn with their 439 
corporate headquarters and within 12 hours you had privately hired sheriffs from Louisiana 440 
doing gate-guard duty.’ No indirect costs or intangible consequences related to security issues 441 
(e.g. looting) were reported by any sources. 442 
5.3 Contrasting findings from Gulfport, MS 443 
 . The Port of Gulfport, MS is Mississippi’s largest port, and it experienced profound 444 
damage from Hurricane Katrina in 2005. Becker et al. (2014) reported impacts from Katrina on 445 
the port and surrounding community using the same methodology. 446 
 Nearly all Red Hook interviewees emphasized the rapid turnaround of port recovery. 447 
While community stakeholders in Red Hook have indicated that economic recovery in the 448 
community has been protracted and remains incomplete, the port system resumed critical 449 
operations within 10 days. This stands in sharp contrast with the severe, long-term shutdown at 450 
Gulfport and the associated intangible consequences identified, such as supply-side fluctuations 451 
in the labor market, complete facility destruction and reconstruction, and permanent loss of 452 
revenue or lines of business.  453 
This distinction points to a disparity in the economic and institutional capacity of the two ports’ 454 
different stakeholder clusters to recover, as well as the effectiveness of recovery activities 455 
coordination across those clusters. Becker et al. found that existing resilience planning processes 456 
in Gulfport revolved around the responsibilities and interests of internal and economic external 457 
stakeholders, without involving other external stakeholders, and that, as a consequence, planning 458 
processes failed to account for significant portions of the impacts experienced after Hurricane 459 
Katrina, especially indirect and intangible impacts which impaired long-term recovery. The 460 
 21 
experience of RHCT drives this point home by illustrating that, where resilience planning 461 
anticipated impacts and built institutional relationships that could be activated to coordinate 462 
response and recovery, response operations brought systems online quickly, such as in the case 463 
of waterway debris clearing, whereas unanticipated impacts led to lack of coordination and 464 
enduring impairment of recovery, such as in the case of the fuel shortage. 465 
6. Conclusion 466 
 This case study of the Red Hook Container Terminal in Hurricane Sandy extends the 467 
methods of Becker et al. (2014) to the highly integrated, intermodal port system of New York 468 
City.  Interviews with key stakeholders indicated clear interdependencies among stakeholders in 469 
ability to storm recovery activities, caused by indirect and intangible impacts which propagated 470 
across the stakeholder cluster. Where the disaster planning process had instituted post-disaster 471 
coordination frameworks for those interdependencies – such as in the case of regional fuel 472 
supplies – stakeholders were able to coordinate and rapidly recover. Where institutional lines of 473 
coordination did not exist – such as in the case of the electrical grid – the recovery process was 474 
impaired and secondary costs were incurred to endure the impact during the recovery process. 475 
The results from Red Hook emphasize that coordination between stakeholder institutions is an 476 
effective strategy for efficiently recovering from major storm events. Information like the 477 
stakeholder impacts solicited in this project can inform and support the capacity of resilience 478 
planning to comprehensively involve all relevant stakeholders in a port system in procedures and 479 
investments to build port resilience.480 
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Appendix A – Interview Instrument 
INTERVIEW INSTRUMENT FOR RED HOOK, NEW YORK 
Modified from Becker 2014 
 
INFO = Information to be given to informant 
Blue = notes for interviewer 
 
OVERVIEW 
Respondent Name; Date; Interviewer; Organization; Position. 
 
Section I: Background on institutions and interviewees (5 minutes) 
 
INFO: There are 13 questions, concerned with your organization’s relationship to Red Hook Terminal and to your 
organization’s experiences in the aftermath of Sandy. I will record the interview. Your responses to these questions 
will be kept private, and neither your name nor your organization’s name will be tied to any specific response, either 
in internal transcripts or in any publications. This should take about 30 minutes. 
 
Please tell me about your organization’s management responsibilities. 
(Setting the stage here to have the scope of jurisdiction and mandate in their words, and get at 
interactions among stakeholders) 
Follow up (FUP) A: Could you tell me a bit about the current priorities your organization has? 
FUP B: Does your organization interact with other local, state, regional or even federal agencies or companies to do 
its work? 
 
And what specifically does your work entail? 
FUP A: So you manage …. What does that actually mean as far as your daily work is concerned? 
FUP B: Who do you interact with regularly to accomplish this? 
FUP C: How long have you been in this position? 
FUP D: What is your education background (degrees and discipline)? 
 
Can you describe the decision-making process for long-term planning and investing bit more? 
These questions are likely to bring out issues of conflict, institutional cooperation or lack thereof. They are included 
for completeness. 
FUP A: Who applies/proposes/initiates?.... 
FUP B: Who else is involved? 
FUP C: Are your decisions reviewed by some higher authority? 
FUP D: Can anyone appeal or supersede your decisions? How does that process work? 
FUP E: What information is required so you can make an adequate assessment? 
FUP F: How long does it take to complete one project/application? How often do you have to make these kinds of 
decisions? 
FUP E: What are the most significant changes in your work in the last five years (assuming the person has been in 
this or similar position for this long) 
 
This research is about the “port system.” This includes all of the various functions, costs, and benefits of the port 
that could be of concern for the region. Please tell us about your organization’s management or planning 
responsibilities in terms of the port system. 
FUP A: Could you tell me a bit about the current priorities your organization has with respect to the port? 
FUP B: Does your organization interact with other local, state, regional or even federal agencies or companies to do 
its work and meet its port-related goals? 
FUP C: How does the port fit under your organization’s mandate? 
FUP C: How does the port fit under your organizations jurisdiction? 
FUP D: To what extent is your organization dependent on the success of the port? 
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Section II. Impacts of storm events (20 minutes) 
 
INFO: Present the interviewee with the storm scenario and functions of the port. 
Let’s turn to your experience with Sandy. The port has a number of functions for the region and these functions were 
impacted by the storm. As we go through the rest of the interview, I’d like you to consider this storm event and the 
functions of the port as you answer the questions. 
 
Did you have to prepare/account/plan for these kinds of events? 
FUP A: In what ways, how so, etc. 
 
Consider how Sandy impacted Red Hook Terminal and the surrounding neighborhood. How did the storm affect the 
resources and responsibilities within your jurisdiction (including infrastructure, social well-being, ecosystems, etc.)?  
FUP A: What were your immediate concerns? 
FUP B: What impacts were difficult to address in the immediate aftermath? 
FUP C: Can you get more specific on what the impacts were? 
 
Probe for STEEPLE impacts – six drivers of decision making (drivers of change) 
 
S – Social T – Technological EN – Environmental EC – Economic P – Political LE – Legal 
Environmental Social Economic Infrastructure Other 
Petroleum Release Jobs 
lost/unemployment 
Lost business Power outage Loss of 
competitive 
advantage 
Hazmats released Jobs created Tenants relocate Water supply Fences and 
signs 
Debris (small) Workers displaced Cleanup costs Utilities (general) Tree debris 
Debris (large)  Preparation costs Cranes damaged Lost data 
  Repair costs Roads/Bridges  
  Damage to product Rail  
  Can’t get insurance Piers  
   On-site buildings  
 
FOR EACH IMPACT: 
 
You described one impact … How was your organization affected by that impact? 
INFO: Interested not only in damage and costs but also effects on ability to operate. 
FUP A: How did operations have to change to accommodate the impact? 
FUP B: How long did the impact affect operations? 
FUP C: Were there permanent consequences of that impact on the organization? 
 
Who else was affected in that way by that impact? 
 
How did your organization deal with that impact? 
FUP A: What resources were available to you to respond? Were they sufficient? 
FUP B: What plans or policies did you have in place? Were they effective? 
FUP C: What information was available to you to enable decision-making? Was it sufficient? 
 
Who was responsible for dealing with or resolving the consequences of that impact? 
INFO: I am interested not just in who paid and how they paid for it, but also who had to dedicate time and labor, 
handle paperwork and liaise with other organizations. 
FUP A: Was the impact anticipated or was there a gap in responsibilities or organizations’ understanding of each 
other’s responsibilities? 
 
Who actually ended up dealing with or resolving the consequences of that impact? 
FUP A: Did someone have to step in to handle the impact? 
FUP B: Was there a gap in responsibilities or organizations’ understanding of each other’s responsibilities? 
 6 
 
Has your organization changed any policies or taken any steps to prepare for the next storm, in response to your 
experiences dealing with that impact? 
 
Closing. [at discretion, depending on length of interview] 
  
Is there anything else we might have missed that you want to add about the storm resilience process you’ve gone 
through so far? 
Are there any other stakeholders for Red Hook Terminal that I should be speaking with for this project? Who in that 
organization should I speak to about these issues? 
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
Table 1 – Interviewees 
 
Stakeholder Organization Port Interest Interviews 
Internal Port Authority of New 
York & New Jersey 
Lessor of Terminal land and 
facilities 
2 
External: Public Policy US Coast Guard Inspect and maintain waterways and 
port security 
2 
External: Community PortSide NewYork Preserve and advocate for maritime 
culture in Red Hook 
1 
 
Table 2 – Written Sources 
 
Source Title Type Objectives 
Smythe 2013 Assessing the Impacts of Hurricane Sandy 
on the Port of New York and New Jersey’s 
Maritime Responders and Response 
Infrastructure 
Academic Identify lessons learned 
from maritime responders, 
including first responders, 
to Sandy. 
Wakeman & 
Miller 2013 
Lessons from Hurricane Sandy for Port 
Resilience 
Academic Interview stakeholders and 
review design codes to 
identify opportunities to 
enhance resilience. 
DesRoches & 
Murrell 2014 
Transportation Infrastructure Resiliency 
Guidelines for the Port Authority of New 
York & New Jersey 
Academic Describe changes to 
PANYNJ Design 
Guidelines made in post-
Sandy review. 
PortSide 
NewYork 2016 
Red Hook WaterStories:  
Red Hook Container Terminal 
Virtual 
Museum 
Record culture and history 
of the Red Hook 
community through oral 
histories and feature essays. 
NYS2100 2013 Recommendations to Improve the Strength 
and Resilience of the Empire State's 
Infrastructure 
Gov't Report Identify vulnerabilities and 
recommend resilience 
improvements for all state 
infrastructure. 
NIAC 2015 Transportation Sector Resilience  
Final Report and Recommendations 
Gov't Report Identify gaps and 
opportunities in national 
transportation system 
resilience. 
MarEx Staff 2012 Update: Assessment and Response from 
Storm Damage Caused by Hurricane Sandy 
Begins 
Journalism October 30, 2012 
Campbell 2012 Sandy snarls NY Harbor oil logistics, 
NYMEX gasoline delivery 
Journalism November 1, 2012 
Gebrekidan 2012 More NY oil terminals online, gasoline 
lines persist post Sandy 
Journalism November 4, 2012 
Strunsky 2012 Port resumes operations in Sandy's wake Journalism November 4, 2012 
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Table 3 – Direct Damages 
Table 3 - Direct Damages 
 
Table of direct damages reported by interviewees and reports. X’s 
in rightmost columns indicate stakeholder groups which bore the 
burden of recovering from each impact by, for instance, paying the 
costs of repairs. 
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Damage to port facilities 
Damage to berths 
 
X X X 
 
Damage to security cameras 
 
X X X 
 
Damage to security fence 
 
X X X 
 
Damage to water pump at fire stations X 
  
X 
 
Damage to fuel pumps 
 
X X X 
 
Damage to oil tanks 
 
X X X 
 
Damage to pump stations X 
  
X 
 
Damage to sheds 
 
X X X 
 
Damage to storm drains X 
  
X 
 
Damage to transformers 
 
X X X 
 
Damage to underground infrastructure (generally) X X X X 
 
Damage to port facilities (generally) X X X X 
 
Damage to terminal equipment 
Damage to cargo handling equipment 
 
X 
 
X 
 
Damage to computer systems X X X X 
 
Damage to cranes 
 
X 
 
X 
 
Damage to CBP radiological screening equipment 
   
X 
 
Damage to trucks 
 
X X X 
 
Damage to vessels 
Barge stranded on berth 
  
X 
  
Damage to barges (generally) 
  
X 
  
Damage to goods or cargo 
Flooded cars 
  
X 
  
Containers washed away 
  
X 
  
Damage to goods or cargo (generally) 
  
X 
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Table 4 – Indirect Costs 
Table 4 - Indirect Costs 
 
Table of indirect reported by interviewees and reports. X’s in 
rightmost columns indicate stakeholder groups which bore the 
burden of recovering from each impact by, for instance, writing 
off lost revenue. 
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Costs of Recovery 
Cost of renting generators to run cranes during repairs 
 
X 
   
Cost of environmental compliance during repairs X X X X 
 
Cost of hiring private security during repairs to security systems 
 
X 
   
Obligation to conduct facility inspections to identify damages X X X 
  
Costs of retrieving rerouted cargo    X   
Obligation to survey aids to navigation 
   
X 
 
Obligation to conduct facility security inspections X X X X 
 
Obligation to survey waterways for shoaling 
   
X 
 
Obligation to survey waterways for debris/obstacles 
   
X 
 
Cost of oil spill containment 
 
X X 
  
Costs of environmental hazard containment (generally) X X X X 
 
Navigational Impairment 
Damage to aids to navigation    X  
Adrift vessels 
  
X X X 
Containers floating in the waterway 
  
X X 
 
Debris in waterway 
  
X X 
 
Interruptions to Operations 
Closure of waterways    X  
Damage to administrative offices impaired operations X X X X 
 
Evacuation of vessels from the harbor 
  
X 
  
Lost wages 
    
X 
Interruption to operations during recovery (generally) X X X X X 
Impacts on Port-Dependent Commerce 
Disruption of sewage transit services 
   
X 
 
Disruption of tug and barge service 
  
X 
  
Disruption of water taxi service   X   
Disruption of ferry service   X   
Cargo delayed and rerouted to other ports  
  
X 
  
Disruption of the flow of blood and medical supplies 
  
X X X 
Disruption of the flow of emergency supplies 
  
X X X 
Disruption of the flow of food supplies 
  
X X X 
Disruption of the flow of goods (generally) 
  
X X X 
Widespread, long-term fuel shortage 
 
X X X 
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Table 5 – Intangible Consequences 
Table 5 - Intangible Consequences 
 
Table of intangible consequences reported by interviewees and 
reports. X’s in rightmost columns indicate stakeholder groups which 
bore the burden of recovering from each impact by, for instance, 
dedicating time and effort to resolving an impairment of normal 
operations. 
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Port Damages which Impair Port Recovery 
Private operations cannot resume until PANYNJ operations resume X     
Disruption to communication systems 
   
X X 
Inability to use roads due to damaged traffic signals X X 
 
X 
 
Inability to work effectively due to damaged lighting X X X X  
Debris on roads and terminals X X X X 
 
Damage to equipment for harbor surveying 
   
X 
 
Sewage backup from overflowing combined sewers X X 
 
X 
 
Damage to back-up generators X X 
 
X 
 
Emergency Conditions which Impair Port Recovery 
Severe cold without fuel supplies X X X X X 
Obligation to revisit and reassess pre-storm long-term plans X X X X 
 
Burdensome paperwork X X X X X 
Widespread, long-term power outages X X X X X 
Stress from performance of tasks outside training and job duties X X X X 
 
Difficulty learning new disaster recovery regulations and procedures X X X X 
 
Personnel unable to reach port facilities X X X X 
 
Personnel contending with damage to own homes X X X X X 
Emotional toll of the widespread damage X X X X X 
Widespread devastation throughout the community (generally) 
   
X X 
Port-Related Damages to the Surrounding Community 
Ecological damage of oil spills 
 
X 
 
X 
 
Oil carried inland by surge 
    
X 
Sediment washed onto shore 
   
X X 
Containers washed onto shore 
  
X X X 
Consequences of Port Disruption to the Broader Economy 
CBP operations delayed by damage to computer systems 
   
X 
 
Cruise ships rerouted from destination   X   
Cruise ships' passengers' cars destroyed in terminal parking lots     X 
Disruption of the flow of goods during the holiday season   X  X 
Disruption of the global supply chain  X X   
Disruption of international fuel market due to fuel shortage 
 
X X 
  
Impairment of regional recovery due to fuel shortage 
   
X X 
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Table 6 – Impacts Reported as Affecting 4 or 5 Categories of Stakeholder 
Table 6 – Impacts Reported as Affecting  
4 or 5 Categories of Stakeholder 
 
X’s in rightmost columns indicate stakeholder groups which bore the 
burden of recovering from each impact. 
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Direct Damages – Damage to port facilities 
Damage to underground infrastructure (generally) X X X X 
 
Damage to port facilities (generally) X X X X 
 
Direct Damages – Damage to terminal equipment 
Damage to computer systems X X X X 
 
Indirect Costs – Costs of Recovery 
Cost of environmental compliance during repairs X X X X 
 
Obligation to conduct facility security inspections X X X X 
 
Costs of environmental hazard containment (generally) X X X X 
 
Damage to administrative offices impaired operations X X X X 
 
Interruption to operations during recovery (generally) X X X X X 
Intangible Consequences – Port Damages which Impair Port Recovery 
Damage to lighting X X X X  
Debris on roads and terminals X X X X 
 
Intangible Consequences – Emergency Conditions which Impair Port Recovery 
Severe cold weather following days after the storm cut off fuel supplies X X X X X 
Obligation to revisit and reassess pre-storm long-term plans X X X X 
 
Burdensome paperwork X X X X X 
Widespread, long-term power outages X X X X X 
Personnel must perform tasks outside their training and job duties X X X X 
 
Difficulty learning new disaster recovery regulations and procedures X X X X 
 
Personnel unable to reach port facilities X X X X 
 
Personnel contending with damage to own homes X X X X X 
Emotional toll of the widespread damage X X X X X 
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Figure 1: 
Red Hook Container Terminal is in Brooklyn, New York, USA at the mouth of New York 
Harbor and is the easternmost terminal in the Port of New York and New Jersey. The terminal is 
positioned along Buttermilk Channel, across from Governor’s Island. Imagery generated by 
Google. 
 
